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WOOD v. STRICKLAND: OBJECTIFYING THE STANDARD
OF GOOD FAITH FOR SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS
IN DEFENSE TO PERSONAL LIABILITY
UNDER SECTION 1983
The cloak of immunity from personal liability enjoyed by many
governmental officials for unconstitutional activities undertaken in their
official capacities has been a frequent source of controversy among the
federal courts.1 The swelling number of lawsuits seeking compensatory
and punitive relief from police officers,2 legislators,3 judges,4 and a
1. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976) (prosecutor held absolutely immune
from personal liability for allegedly unconstitutional prosecution); Doe v. McMillan, 412
U.S. 306 (1973) (congressional committee members and their staffs held absolutely
immune from liability under the speech and debate clause for invasion of privacy of
D.C. school children in congressional report); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
(police officer performing official duties possesses qualified immunity in false ar-
rest action, dependent upon establishment of good faith); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959) (acting director of the Office of Rent Stabilization had absolute im-
munity from liability for libel); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (mem-
bers of California legislature held immune from civil liability for acts undertaken
by official investigative committee); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974) (members of Utah State Board of Education were
entitled to qualified immunity in action for damages brought by discharged professor,
so long as they acted without malice); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971) (probation officer performing "quasi judicial" function
held immune from liability for omission of material facts and false statement of facts
in submitted report); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3rd Cir. 1966) (county prosecutor
held immune from liability for prosecution of a minor in contravention of New Jersey
statute prohibiting such prosecution); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1964)
(state district court judge, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of court, sheriffs, police and
prison officials held immune from liability for actions undertaken in official capacities
in contempt prosecution); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio
1973) (probate judge stripped of immunity for acting outside of his jurisdiction in order-
ing young girl to submit to sterilization). See generally Jennings, Tort Liability of Ad-
ininistrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Jennings]; Note,
Civil Liability of Subordinate State Officials Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts and
the Doctrine of Official Immunity, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 887 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Subordinate State Officials]; Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the
Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARv. L. Rlv. 1229 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Note, Doctrine of
Official Immunity].
2. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961);
Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333 (3rd Cir. 1974); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir.
1974); Reed v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 372 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Moon v. Winfield, 368 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Il1. 1973).
3. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951); Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917
(1974); Morgan v. Sylvester, 125 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
4. Hill v. McClellan, 490 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974) (action by state prisoner alleging
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variety of lesser administrative officials,5 testifies to the fact that such
individuals have been forced in increasing numbers to account for the
actions which they undertake in their official capacities.' The result of
that Texas state court judge and others conspired to have default judgment in divorce
entered against him while he was in prison and could not attend the hearing); Blouin
v. Dembitz, 367 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afj'd, 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973) (ac-
tions by husbands challenging constitutionality of New York statutes and judicial pro-
cedures by family court judges in adjudicating support rights of nonresident dependents).
5. Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 374 F. Supp. 1361
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 520 F.2d 420 (1975) (class action on behalf of Black and
Hispanic candidates challenging state civil service examination for office of Correction
Sergeant); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1974) (action by
County Treasurer against County Executive, Chief Administrative Officer, Director of
Finance and director of county complaint office seeking injunction from imminent re-
moval and monetary damages); Scarrella v. Spannaus, 376 F. Supp. 857 (D. Minn.
1974) (action against State Attorney General, County Auditor, City Clerks, City Attor-
neys and others for refusal to place plaintiff's name on election ballot for Municipal
Court Judge); Collins v. Schoonfield, 363 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Md. 1973) (action brought
by pretrial detainees against certain jail officials); Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Supp.
478 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), modified, 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (action by operators of bar pro-
viding topless entertainment against police commissioner for enforcement of town ordi-
nance prohibiting across the board non-obscene conduct in the form of topless dancing
in any public place).
6. The majority of thege suits have been filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)
which mandates that
relvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
The decade following the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) produced a sudden proliferation of section 1983 actions.
In Monroe, the Court expanded the scope of potential persons who act "under color of
state law," by declaring that police officers who conducted an admittedly unconstitu-
tional search were nevertheless operating within the perimeter of state authority. Id.
at 183-87.
There are a variety of reasons for the sudden popularity of the civil remedy for consti-
tutional infractions committed by state officers. One of the most significant advantages
of seeking redress under section 1983 is that the plaintiff is relieved of the necessity
of demonstrating a specific intent on the part of the official to violate constitutional
mandates. This stringent intent requirement is mandated under the criminal counterpart
to section 1983:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom, wilfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on ac-
count of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than
are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000,
or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject
to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court emphasized the "wilful
intent" requirement in Screws v, United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Screws involved
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this closer scrutiny of executive, legislative, judicial and administrative
activities is that such officers must now face the rising possibility of
paying monetary awards from their own pockets if they infringe upon
the constitutional rights of other individuals in the course of performing
their delegated duties.
Of special interest in recent years7 have been school board
members-on both the local and state levels-who have been joined as
individuals in actions for injunctive and compensatory relief brought by
teachers," non-professional personnel, 9 and students.' 0 The majority of
the assault and fatal beating of a black man by local law enforcement officials in Geor-
gia. The Court concluded that what was then section 20 of the Criminal Code (pres-
ently 18 U.S.C. § 242) required that the defendants have the specific purpose of depriv-
ing the plaintiff of an express constitutional right, before a conviction could be sustained.
Id. at 101. The Court noted that "a requirement of a specific intent to deprive a person
of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law saves the Act from
any charge of unconstitutionality on the grounds of vagueness." Id. at 103.
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court reiterated the lack of "intent"
required under a section 1983 action:
In the Screws case we dealt with a statute that imposed criminal penalties for
acts "wilfully" done. We construed that word in its setting to mean the doing of
an act with "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." 325 U.S. at
103. We do not think that gloss should be placed on § 1979 [1983] which we have
here .... Section 1979 should be read against the background of tort liability
that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.
Id. at 187. See also Berch, Money Damages for Fourth Amendment Violations by Fed-
eral Officials of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics: An Explanation of Bivens, 1971 L.
& Soc. ORDER 43 [hereinafter cited as Berch].
7. The last several years have seen a sharp increase in judicial awareness of the consti-
tutional rights of both teachers and school children. This has led to a concomitant in-
terest in scrutinizing the role of school board members who define the standards which
students and teachers must follow. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975);
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Chambers v. Hendersonville City
Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D.
Ala. 1955). See generally Note, Damages Under § 1983: The School Context, 46 IND.
L.J. 521 at 521 (1970) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Note, Damages Under §
1983].
8. Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974)
(Associate Professor brought action for unlawful discharge of employment and stated
cause of action because board acted unjustifiably); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d
287 (7th Cir. 1968) (former probationary teachers stated a cause of action under section
1983 against elected members of the Board of Education upon the allegation that they
were discriminatorily discharged because of their union membership); Courtney v.
School Dist. #1, 371 F. Supp. 401 (D. Wyo. 1974) (teacher stated cause of action for
wrongful termination of employment as well as libel and slander in the filing of a State
Department of Education form); Gouge v. Joint School Dist. #1, 310 F. Supp. 984
(W.D. Wis. 1970) (teachers sought reinstatement and compensatory and punitive dam-
ages after non-renewal of employment contracts).
9. Hayes v. Cape Henlopen School Dist., 341 F. Suop. 823 (D. Del. 1972) (secretary
to school district and her husband brought action seeking injunctive and monetary relief
for refusal to rehire her to her former position); Gomez v. Board of Educ., 516 P.2d
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these suits have been filed pursuant to the Federal Civil Rights Act,"
based on constitutional infractions committed by board members in
their decision-making role.' 2 The issue in each of these cases has been
whether the doctrine of official immunity should extend to individual
members of a school district's policymaking unit; and if so, the extent of
that immunity when individuals-rather than the school district as a
governmental agency' 3 are asked to monetarily compensate the plaintiff
679 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (bus driver brought action for alleged discriminatory failure
to renew employment contract).
10. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (two public high school students
brought action claiming that their expulsion for bringing intoxicating liquor on to school
grounds was improper and unconstitutional); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (Ohio
public school children brought class action for review of suspensions from school under
Ohio statute); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
826 (1970) (school authorities unjustifiably expelled two students in violation of the
first and fourteenth amendments for writing off campus, and distributing at school a
paper critical of the school administration); Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.
1969) (students brought action for unlawful expulsion because the allegation of "miscon-
duct" did not relate to any pre-established disciplinary rule).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
12. The section 1983 remedy has been used frequently and effectively by teachers
seeking redress for discriminatory employment practices. See North Carolina Teachers
Ass'n v. Asheboro City Bd. of Educ., 393 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1968) (suit to determine
whether rights of black teachers displaced by desegregation of black schools were vio-
lated upon failure to re-employ them); Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d
275 (4th Cir. 1967) (teachers challenged non-retention of employment contracts because
of shift in desegregation plan which resulted in decrease in allocation of teachers in
black schools); Smith v. Board of Educ. of Morrilton School Dist., 365 F.2d 770 (8th
Cir. 1966) (black teachers sought injunction requiring employment of high school
teachers without regard to race and reassignment of elementary teachers without regard
to race); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966)
(black teachers sought injunctive relief requiring employers to devise definite objective
standards for employment of teachers on a basis other than race); Jones v. Dinwiddie
County School Bd., 373 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Va. 1974) (white teacher brought action
for restoration of lost salary, alleging that her employment was terminated because she
voluntarily participated in desegregation of schools); Williams v. Kimbrough, 295 F.
Supp. 578 (W.D. La.) aff'd, 415 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 396 U.S.
10 (1970) (originally a class action on behalf of black students seeking relief for ra-
cially discriminatory operation of schools; court held that black teachers were dismissed
on a discriminatory basis when the Board of Education replaced them with white teach-
ers after court ordered desegregation of faculty). See generally Seitz, Due Process for
Public School Teachers in Nonreneval and Discharge Situations, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 881
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Seitz].
13. It has been held by several courts that the school district itself, existing as a
municipal corporation, cannot qualify as a "person" under section 1983, and therefore,
cannot be held accountable for damages under the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Harvey
v. Sadler, 331 F.2d 387, 390 (9th Cir. 1964); Kelly v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, 367 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Davis v. Barr, 373 F. Supp. 740,
747 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
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for the deprivation of a constitutional right.'4
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed itself to this
issue in Wood v. Strickland.1" The controversy involved two students
who were expelled for violating a school regulation prohibiting the
possession of alcoholic beverages on school grounds or at school func-
tions. 16 Seeking injunctive and declaratory relief as well as monetary
damages pursuant to section 1983,1 the students claimed that the
expulsion procedures were undertaken in a manner which deprived
them of due process of law.' The gravamen of the students' complaint
14. See generally notes 70-107 infra and accompanying text.
15. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
16. The regulation reads as follows:
Suspension
b. Valid causes for suspension from school on first offense: Pupils found to be
guilty of any of the following shall be suspended from school on the first offense
for the balance of the semester and such suspension will be noted on the permanent
record of the student along with reason for suspension.
(4). The use of intoxicating beverage or possession of same at school or at a
school sponsored activity.
Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F. Supp. 244, 245-46 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
17. The complaint named as defendants, P.T. Wailer, the Principal of Mena High
School, S.L. Inlow, then Superintendent of Schools, the Mena Special School District
and the individual members of the Board of Education. The amended complaint sought
compensatory and punitive damages against all defendants, "injunctive relief allowing
[the students] to resume attendance, preventing [the defendants] from imposing any
sanctions as a result of the expulsion, and restraining enforcement of the challenged reg-
ulation, declaratory relief as to the constitutional invalidity of the regulation, and ex-
punction of any record of their expulsion." 420 U.S. at 310.
The remedy provided by the Civil Rights Act has been broadly construed to encom-
pass all three forms of relief. The statute specifically provides that a person acting
under color of state law shall be liable "in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress," for depriving any individual of a constitutional right. 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974) (held
that the eleventh amendment does not present a jurisdictional bar to the section 1983
action for damages); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (a declaratory judgment
may be issued independently of an injunction as a remedy in the section 1983 setting);
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 229 (1972) (Congress plainly authorized the federal
courts to issue injunctions in section 1983 actions). In the Mitchum case, the Court
interpreted the possibility of injunctive relief quite broadly, holding that the section 1983
suit would constitute an exception to the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1970), which normally prohibits an injunction against a pending state court proceeding.
407 U.S. at 242-43.
18. The application of the fourteenth amendment due process clause to the school
context poses a host of complex questions concerning the extent to which students may
be deprived of the substantive right to acquire an education and the procedural circum-
stances under which this deprivation may take place. A clearcut distinction between the
"substantive" and "procedural" due process rights of both students and teachers is lack-
ing under the existing case law. See note 20 infra.
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in Wood was that the meeting at which the board members voted for
expulsion was not conducted under the procedural safeguards which the
Constitution mandates.'0 These procedural safeguards were defined
by the Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez.20
The initial meeting of the Mena Special School District Board of
Education at which the one semester expulsion of Peggy Strickland and
Virginia Crain was decreed did not comply with the Goss standards. The
findings of fact of the district court were as follows: On February 18,
1972 the two named plaintiffs and a third student, Jo Wall, were urged
to go to the principal by their home economics teacher, Mrs. Powell. At
that time, they "confessed" to spiking the punch at a recent class
function, with what the students' claimed were two twelve ounce bottles
of malt liquor. Pursuant to the school regulation prohibiting such
conduct,2 ' the principal suspended the girls pending further action by
the school board.22 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized
the lengthy findings of fact by the district court with regard to this initial
meeting:
Without adequate notice to the students and with no notice to their
parents, a special meeting of the school board was held the night of
February 12, [1972] to consider the matter. The only people in attend-
ance were the members of the Board, Mr. Inlow, Mr. Waller and Mrs.
Powell. Mrs. Powell relayed the girls' statements [of regret] to the
Board and she, along with Mr. Wailer, recommended leniency. Shortly
after these recommendations were made, a telephone call was received
by Mr. Inlow [the substance of which was that one of the girls was
involved in a fight after a basketball game that evening].... With this,
Mrs. Powell and Principal Waller withdrew their recommendations and
"washed their hands" of the matter. The Board voted to suspend all
three students for the balance of the semester.
23
It was clear to the appellate court that procedural due process had
been denied to the students at the February 12th meeting. The court
noted that the procedural defect may have been cured at a subsequent
meeting held March 2, 1972, because the girls and their parents were
given notice "promptly" after the suspension and were later afforded the
opportunity to present evidence. The district court directed verdicts
for all of the named defendants, concluding that in the absence of a
19. 420 U.S. at 310.
20. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
21. See note 16 supra.
22. 348 F. Supp. at 246.
23. Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1973).
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showing of malicious ill will toward the students, the officials were
immune from personal liability. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, as to the board members only, on the ground that
the students rights to "substantive due process" had been violated.2 4
The board members appealed the decision to the United States Su-
preme Court, which in turn fashioned a standard of "qualified immuni-
24. Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1973). The directed verdicts awarded
by the district court to the Principal, Superintendent and school district were affirmed.
Id. at 191.
In its determination that the students experienced a violation of "substantive due
process" the court of appeals emphasized the lack of evidence presented to the board
to sustain a finding that the school regulation was violated. The court then sum-
marily concluded-without specifying which constitutionally guaranteed rights had
been violated-that the students were denied "substantive due process," and that
they were entitled to have their records expunged and to return to school. Id.
The court emphasized, however, that the school district was acting fully within its
policy making authority by prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicants at school
functions. Id. In the area of educational rights, there has been a lack of
enumeration of the specific rights which are guaranteed by the due process clause.
The Supreme Court has recently declared that a student's entitlement to public
education may be a property right under the fourteenth amendment, if so recognized by
the state, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975); however other decisions have
been much more specific in delineating the substantive rights which students enjoy. See,
e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students have a consti-
tutional right to wear armbands protesting the Vietnam war, as part of free expression
protected by the first amendment); Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp. 185 (D.N.H.
1970) (students have a limited constitutional right to wear clothes of their choice). It
is clear, however, that substantive and procedural due process guarantees cannot be pre-
cisely categorized, and at times they tend to mesh. See generally Note, Students Consti-
tutional Rights in Public Secondary Education, 14 WASHB URN L.J. 106 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Note, Students Constitutional Rights]; Note, Education-Due Process for
Washington Public School Students', 50 WASH. L. REv. 675, 676-80 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Washington Public School Students].
While case law indicates that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was justified in
concluding that the students' procedural due process rights were violated in Wood, see
note 18 supra, the majority's reliance upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support
a judgment that substantive due process was violated does not comport with existing case
law. If the court had based its conclusion on the denial of the students' rights to attend
school, it would have had more basis in the existing case law. See Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975). However, the lack of solid evidence appears to be a procedural rather
than a substantive basis for finding a due process violation.
The Supreme Court appears to have reversed the decision of the court of appeals with
respect to the substantive due process claim; at the very least it casts doubt on the reason-
ing. Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority, notes that "[g]iven the fact that there
was evidence supporting the charge against respondents, the contrary judgment of the
court of appeals is improvident." 420 U.S. at 326. The Court implies that the
regulation involved does not violate a substantive right of the students, for in
citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968), the Court notes that it will
not interfere with a discretionary judgment of a school board when the exercise of that
discretion does not violate a specifically guaranteed constitutional right. Id.
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ty" for school board members in such circumstances. 2  The standard
enunciated by the Court appears to encompass both subjective and
objective aspects.2" On the subjective level, a defense of immunity will
not be established on behalf of a board member "if he took the action
with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights or other injury to the student.- 7  The focus of this portion of the
25. 420 U.S. at 322. See notes 108-32 infra, and accompanying text.
26. The tendency of courts to employ either a widespread "objective" criteria or a
more personalized "subjective" standard in judging the conduct of an individual or deter-
mining the intentions of the parties is prevalent in a variety of areas of the law.
For at least a century, the objective theory of contracts has been dominant. A. COR-
BIN, CONTRACTS, §§ 106, 156-57 (one vol. ed. 1952). See Hotchkiss v. National City
Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) afj'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir.), af 'd 231
U.S. 50 (1913); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 227, comment a at 306 (1932).
In tort law, as well, objective/subjective standards are widely employed. W. PROSSEa,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 150 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Seavy, Negligence
-- Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. Rtv. 1 (1927).
Criminal law, on the other hand, relies almost solely upon the subjective intention of
the particular party. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HAzNnDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 195-203 (1972); United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1965) (omission
of criminal intent as one of the enumerated essential elements in a charge of receiving
an unauthorized fee in connection with official tasks constituted plain error); People v.
Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964) (reasonable and
honest mistake of age is valid defense to a charge of statutory rape). But cf. United
States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (defendant convicted pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 5812
(a) (1970) which makes it unlawful for any person "to receive or possess a firearm
which is not registered to him, regardless of lack of "intent"). However, determination
of whether a strict liability criminal offense has been committed comes closer to an "ob-
jective" standard, although it is the commission of the act itself, rather than either the
objective state of mind of the reasonable person or the subjective intention of the defend-
ant which is to be examined. See generally Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court,
1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 107; Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN.
L. Rnv. 731 (1960).
27. 420 U.S. at 322. It is unclear from the majority opinion exactly what the Court
means by "malicious intention" in the school context. The district court judge instructed
the jury that a decision against the board members could only be made upon a finding
that they acted with "ill will" or committed a "wrongful act done intentionally without
just cause or excuse." 348 F. Supp. 244, 248 (W.D. Ark. 1972). This is clearly a "sub-
jective" test; recovery hinges upon the state of mind of the particular board member at
the time that the decision was made or carried out. See generally Jennings, supra note
1. See also Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1965) (postal inspector made
search without consent or warrant or reasonable belief that there was a warrant, and
was not immune from tort liability).
The exact nature of what will constitute "malicious" action is open to speculation.
Few cases have dealt with a precise definition in the realm of school disciplinary pro-
ceedings. In the factual context of the Wood case, it would appear that the action of
the teacher, the principal and the members of the board in "washing their hands" of
the entire matter and suspending the students immediately after receiving the telephoned
information that one of the girls had been involved in a fight at a basketball game was
evidence of a sense of ill will, see note 17 supra. The Court never specifically touches
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Court's test is, of necessity, on the state of mind of the particular
individual at the time the official action was taken. The board mem-
ber's actions will also have to stand scrutiny under a much more
objective standard of conduct in order to establish a defense of immuni-
ty according to the Wood majority opinion, for the defense is now
impermissible if the board member "knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would yiolate the constitutional rights of the student affected .... -28
The Court combines both the subjective and the objective criteria into
one standard of conduct to be applied to the individual school board
member, labeling it a test of "good faith."
A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school board
member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such
disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that
his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.29
upon this apparently arbitrary action, although it certainly could be implied that such
action was taken because of a sense of ill will at the moment, rather than because of
a considered review of the evidence from the incident in question (the spiking of the
punch).
28. 420 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added).
29. Id. The "good faith" test is far from a new concept in the doctrine of official
immunity for public officials under section 1983. See notes 33-45 infra and accompany-
ing text. The "good faith" test has traditionally been regarded as an objective standard
-what would the reasonable person acting in the role of the particular official do in
the questioned situation? See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290-91 (7th
Cir. 1968); Nebraska Dep't. of Roads Employees Assoc. v. Department of Roads, 364
F. Supp. 251, 257 (D. Neb. 1973); Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
309 F. Supp. 184, 189 (E.D. Va. 1970).
In the recent past, the Court has emphasized the "reasonable grounds" necessary for
a defense of good faith; it can only be assumed that this means acceptable with regard
to an objective community defined standard of reasonableness. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
Of necessity, even the most objective standard must contain some elements of sub-
jectivity. Surrounding circumstances are crucial to any determination of how the rea-
sonable person would be expected to act in any given situation. This is certainly the
case in the law of torts, where negligence is defined as the failure to do what the rea-
sonable person would be expected to act in any given situation. This is certainly the
case in the law of torts, where negligence is defined as the failure to do what the rea-
sonable person would do "under the same or similar circumstances." W. PROSSER,
HA nooK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 151 (4th ed. 1971). See generally James, The Qual-
ities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1951).
Thus, reasonable or unreasonable conduct can only be determined by examining the
qualities of the actor himself; it can never be a purely objective test. There are several
ramifications for applying an "objective good faith" test in the context of Wood v.
Strickland. The most significant of these is determining exactly what the "reasonable
school board member" is. Is it a person who has served in the capacity one year, five
years or twenty-five years? Will a board member be more "reasonable" in validly as-
sessing evidence against a teacher or a student in a disciplinary proceeding if he has
more experience on the job? Will a school board member be held accountable for
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As previous case law in the lower federal courts attests, a "good faith"
test of qualified immunity under section 1983 is not altogether new. 0 In
fact, it has long been acknowledged that official actions which are moti-
vated by a sense of personal ill will cannot constitute "good faith,"
and are rarely defensible.3 It is, rather, the "objective" aspect of the
Court's announced standard of conduct which adds a new dimension to
the doctrine of qualified immunity. It is this very aspect with which
the dissenters in Wood take issue. Justice Powell argues with particu-
lar vigor that the Court's requirement that a broard member con-
form his conduct to what he should realize are the constitutional rights
of the student that he is dealing with rests upon an overly optimistic and
unwarranted appraisal of the educational background of the average
school board member. Justice Powell charges that the objective criteria
is unduly "harsh," and "leaves little substance to the doctrine of
qualified immunity."32
This Comment will explore the effect of the Wood decision on the
common law doctrine of qualified immunity, and will seek to define the
present extent of immunity for school board members under section
1983. Particular emphasis will be placed on an analysis of the practical
consequences of applying an objective standard of "knowledgeable con-
duct," which the dissent fears will dilute the defense of immunity to an
unacceptable extent. The final section will focus upon administrative
alternatives to invoking the section 1983 personal liability remedy
against school board members.
knowledge of his duties beyond the average person's knowledge of those duties? Will
the board member be equated with other members of the community who are expected
to possess a minimum of special knowledge and ability beyond the exercise of reasonable
care in their jobs? See, e.g., L.B. Laboratories v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 244 P.2d 385
(1952) (accountant); Wintersteen v. Semler, 250 P.2d 420 (Ore. 1952), reh. denied, 255
P.2d 138 (Ore. 1953) (dentist); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners,
12 VAND. L. REv. 549 (1959). Or, rather, will the board member be considered merely
a citizen holding a public office requiring no special skill or training, and thus be held
only to a standard of the reasonable citizen? See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1114 (West
Supp. 1975); note 117 infra and accompanying text. These questions are of important
significance in the context of the Wood decision, for the Court's explanation of what
will constitute "good faith," while on its face a simple test consistent with the common
law immunity doctrine, may go well beyond the perimeter of what the average "reason-
able" person would be expected to know. See notes 110-23 infra and accompanying
text.
30. See note 29 supra.
31. See generally Note, The Evolution of the State of Mind Requirement of Sec-
tion 1983, 47 TUL. L. REv. 870, 881-85 (1973).
32. 420 U.S. at 329.
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I. TIE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The official immunity doctrine, which "has in large part been of
judicial making,' ' 33 grants immunity to certain governmental officers in
order to allow them to conscientiously perform their duties without the
fear of being forced to respond to costly lawsuits which would consume
their time, energy, and resources. 4 The Supreme Court has expressed
concern that such a fear would tend to inhibit the free and vigorous
decision-making which characterizes the effective administration of gov-
ernment. 5
The common law employed the doctrine of executive immunity long
before the passage of section 1983.36 Under the common law rationale,
legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative officers were protected
from personal liability for acts undertaken and decisions made within
the realm of their granted authority." The defense was utilized primar-
ily in tort actions, where the official was held to answer to individuals
claiming personal and financial injuries as a result of the official's
conduct 8 As more actions were filed pursuant to section 1983, com-
mon law immunity standards were further utilized, and at times expand-
ed, to shield officers from personal liability."
The immunity conferred, however, has not been identical for every
official under similar circumstances. Those whom the courts consid-
ered to be performing a vital governmental function-legislators, judges
and quasi judicial officers-were accorded an "absolute immunity," but
only to the extent they did not act beyond the scope of their official
33. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959).
34. See generally Comment, Subordinate State Officials, supra note 1; Note, The
Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1285, 1295-99 (1953) [herein-
after cited as Note, Scope of Civil Rights Acts].
35. 420 U.S. at 319-20. This argument, and many similar to it, have been advanced
in support of immunity for legislative, judicial and administrative officers who otherwise
would be held liable under section 1983. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306
(1973); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
36. Comment, Smith v. Losee: Official Immunity of School Board Members Un-
der Section 1983, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 820, 821 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Immunity
of School Board Members]; Note, Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, supra note 34, at
1295-99; Note, Subordinate State Officials, supra note 1 at 889-91.
37. Note, Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, supra note 34, at 1296-97.
38. Jennings, supra note 1, at 270-76.
39. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 318-20 (1973); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-54 (1967); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1959); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 376 (1951); Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1973) cert. denied
419 U.S. 882 (1974); Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277, 287-96 (1965).
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duties.40  This absolute defense applied regardless of subjective bad
faith or malicious intent on the part of the particular official.41
A more stringent standard was applied to individuals whose public
offices were regarded as administrative or ministerial. They were
cloaked with only a limited privilege, dependent upon the nature of their
motive or state of mind at the time of their alleged impropriety.42 The
requirements for the defense of this "qualified immunity" varied from
case to case.43  The developing decisional law clearly indicated that such
officials would be immune only if they acted within the ordinary exer-
cise of delegated duties,44 and only if they demonstrated that their
actions were taken in "good faith."45
I1. THE DISCRETIONARY ROLE OF THE
SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER
Many of the governmental officers who are designated to receive
protection under the immunity doctrine are charged with making a great
number of discretionary decisions in the course of their duties. 40 For
40. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
372-76 (1951); Hill v. McClellan, 490 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Burkes
v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971).
41. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (dicta); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 377 (1951).
42. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 482
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d
287, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1968).
43. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973). The majority opinion in
Wood makes a thorough overview of the case law where conflicting standards for the
defense of qualified immunity are utilized. The Court notes that "[tihere is general
agreement on the existence of a 'good faith' immunity, but the courts have either empha-
sized different factors as elements of good faith or have not given specific content to
the good-faith standard." 420 U.S. at 315 (footnote omitted).
44. Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 342 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974); McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263 (1880); Donahue v. Richards, 38 Me. 379
(1854); W. PROSSER, HANDBooK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 989 (4th ed. 1971); R. HAMIL-
TON & Z. REUTrER, LEGAL AspEcrs OF SCHOOL BOARD OPRA'rION 190-91 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as LEGAL AspEcTs]. See generally Comment, Immunity of School
Board Members, supra note 36.
45. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 315-16 n.7; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-
48 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334,
344 (10th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398
F.2d 287, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1968); Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Educ., 372 F.
Supp. 1378, 1382-83 (E.D. Va. 1974); Boyd v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 844, 845-46 (N.D.
Ind. 1973); Jones v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081, 1083-84 (E.D.
Tenn. 1972).
46. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
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this reason, the most frequently employed rationale behind extending
immunity for official actions is to shield the officer from potential
liability for errors in judgment which will inevitably occur when discre-
tion is exercised.47  In recent years, several federal courts have
noted that members of a school district policy-making board have
(1961). Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
47. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877,
883 (10th Cir. 1974); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1974).
See generally Note, Doctrine of Official Immunity, supra note 1.
This argument is commonly employed in civil cases against police officers for damages
stemming from a false arrest or similar fourth amendment violations. The thrust of the
argument is that a police officer is often called upon to make a snap judgment which
ultimately may be determined to be a constitutional infraction, but which is necessitated
by the urgency of the situation. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973)
(federal agents, when charged with duties which require the exercise of discretion, are
immune from liability when they act within the scope of their duties; 18 U.S.C. § 3056
(1970) requires that the instant exercise of judgment be protected); Hampton v. Chi-
cago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974) (the essential
purpose of the doctrine of immunity is to give the officer freedom to exercise his discre-
tion and to perform his official duties without fear that his conduct will be called into
question); Valdez v. Black, 446 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (10th Cir. 1971) (in cases constitut-
ing emergency circumstances, the test of probable cause plus good faith for police may
be significantly reduced). See generally Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Po-
lice and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARv. L. REv. 904 (1962).
With respect to prosecutors as well, courts have noted that the discretionary nature
of their jobs will often shield them from liability. See Guerrero v. Barlow, 494 F.2d
1190 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (key to immunity as a prosecutor is whether the
alleged wrongful acts were committed in the performance of an integral part of the judi-
cial process); Lundblade v. Doyle, 376 F. Supp. 57, 60 (N.D. ]M. 1974) (prosecutors
should be free to exercise their discretionary functions with independence and without
fear of the consequences). This rationale has been most often utilized in cases where
selective prosecution creates a claim of discrimination or malicious harassment. See
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 63
Cal. Rptr. 211 (1967). See generally Cole, Decision to Prosecute, 4 L. & Soc. REv.
331 (1970).
Recognition of the need for broad judicial discretion has resulted in absolute immunity
for all judges acting within their jurisdiction. See Adkins v. Underwood, 370 F. Supp.
510, 513-14 (N.D. Ill. 1974) aff'd 520 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017
(1975) (doctrine of official immunity is for benefit of public so that judge is at liberty
to exercise his discretionary functions with independence); Staud v. Stewart, 366 F.
Supp. 1398, 1401 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (exercise of judicial function itself is highly discre-
tionary and necessitates immunity from personal liability). Cf. United States v. Black-
feet Tribe, 369 F. Supp. 562, 565 (D. Mont. 1973) (judicial immunity does not apply
in damage suit not arising out of performance of official duty).
Finally, legislators have been deemed to be immune when they exercise the discretion
which is often inherent in their scope of authority. This is particularly applicable when
individuals claim their constitutional rights have been violated by official legislative in-
vestigations, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Freeman & Bass, P.A. v. State
of N.J. Comm'n of Investigation, 486 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1973).
162 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
a wide latitude of discretion in passing upon important matters which
affect the rights of employees 48 and students. 49  The myriad of
complex problems which such officers face almost daily places them in a
position of being required to make controversial decisions, the ultimate
correctness of which cannot be conclusively established at the time. 0
While board members are expected to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion before making an important decision, and are constitutionally
required to conduct such investigations within the confines of due
process of law,51 the very nature of their job often mandates that highly
discretionary judgments be made from conflicting findings in the course
of their investigations.5"
48. Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974);
ef. Gay v. Wheeler, 363 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
49. Yench v. Stockmar, 483 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1973); Gay Students Organization
v. Bonner, 367 F. Supp. 1088 (D.N.H.), modified, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
50. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), is a significant example. The school
board was faced, at the February 12th meeting, with a fair amount of evidence leading
to the conclusion that three students had violated the school regulation. Because school
boards do possess discretion in promulgating rules which relate to maintaining the
"orderly conduct" of the educational environment, Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd.
of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th
Cir. 1966), their only consideration was whether the regulation had been violated. The
majority opinion in Wood emphasizes that the court of appeals was unjustified in con-
cluding that the board had violated the students' substantive due process rights by their
finding that the girls had acted contrary to the school regulation:
When the regulation is construed to prohibit the use and possession of beverages
containing alcohol, there was no absence of evidence before the school board to
prove the charge against the respondents. The girls had admitted that they in-
tended to 'spike' the punch....
It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school admin-
istrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion....
The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies necessarily
upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board mem-
bers, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of
errors in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations
of specific constitutional guarantees.
420 U.S. at 325-26 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, at the February 18th meeting, the Mena school board was faced with making
a decision with respect to evidence placed before it, and, absent a clear indication that
constitutional rights were being violated, it would be justified in acting upon the evidence
within the confines of its delegated discretionary function. See also Smith v. Losee, 485
F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
51. See notes 18 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
52. Examples of such decision-making duties are prevalent in the case law. For in-
stance, school boards are constantly required to determine under what circumstances a
teacher's employment may be terminated. Seaman v. Spring Lake Park Independent
School Dist. No. 16, 363 F. Supp. 944 (D. Minn. 1973) (unalterable sex-related function
of pregnancy not sufficient grounds for forced semester leave of absence); Gay v.
Wheeler, 363 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (due process does not require in every in-
stance that a trial type hearing be given before discharge of employment).
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In Smith v. Losee, 53 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted
the nature of the school board member's discretionary role, and the
consequent necessity for a judicially imposed standard of conduct by
which to judge their actions in a case where immunity is asserted as a
defense:
The defendant members of the Board of Education are charged with
broad duties and given extensive powers under the Utah Statutes.
These duties and powers within their limited subject matter are not
greatly dissimilar from those of a legislative body. They are required
to formulate rules and regulations for the institutions, to establish and
announce policies on fundamental matters . . . the decision not .to
renew or to discharge [the professor's contract] was board action
representing an exercise of its discretion vested in it by state law, made
in good faith and without malice, when -the official facts before them
showed a good and valid reason for the decision . . . 4
The average school board member is an individual elected by his
respective community.55 Once elected, the new official is expected to
immediately assume both a legislative and an administrative role in the
governing of the local schools.5 6 As a trustee, he is charged with seeing
In Wishart v. McDonald, 367 F. Supp. 530 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 111
(1974) the district court found that "[in order for the Court to grant the injunctive
relief requested, it must find that the school committee's reasons for dismissing the plain-
tiff were arbitrary or capricious." Id. at 533. The court then cites Drown v. Ports-
mouth School Dist., which outlined three ways in which board action could be held to
be arbitrary or capricious: "[1] . . . a reason for discharge is unrelated to the educa-
tional process or working relationships within the educational institution; [2] . . . it
[may be] trivial; [3] it [may be] wholly unsupported by a basis in uncontested fact
either in the statement of reasons itself or in the teacher's file." Id. at 533, citing
Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1108 (1st Cir. 1971).
Another area of discretionary judgment facing the school board is the delinbation of
the constitutionally permissible dimensions of a student disciplinary proceeding. See
note 18 supra and accompanying text.
Still a third significant area calling for discretion involves the determination of those
areas of student conduct which may be administratively controlled. This often involves
an on-the-spot evaluation of the validity of certain types of activities, and requires a dis-
cretionary balancing of students' substantive constitutional rights, see note 24, supra, with
the need for the board to regulate conduct and to maintain discipline for the effective
maintenance of the school system. See Yench v. Stockmar, 483 F.2d 820 (10th Cir.
1973); Note, Students Constitutional Rights, supra note 24 at 108-110.
53. 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
54. Id. at 343-44.
55. See, e.g., CAL. EDuc. CoDE §§ 1111-1130 (West Supp. 1975), which mandates the
manner in which school board members are to be elected. Cf. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1162
(a) (West Supp. 1975).
56. The role of the board member in helping to carry on the daily functioning of the
school district is extremely broad. The board, as a municipal corporation,'is expected
to prescribe and enforce rules for its own government, Montalvo v. Madera Unified
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that the schools are well budgeted, and that tax dollars are allocated
properly.57 As an employer, he is obligated to assure fair and nondis-
criminatory practices for all employees, and to honor their constitutional
right to due process of law. 8  And finally, as an educational policy
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 21 Cal. App. 3d 323, 98 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1971); CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 925 (West 1969), as well as to execute any powers delegated to it by law. CAL.
EDuc. CODE § 1001 (West 1969). It has the power to repair and insure school property,
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1004 (West 1969), to contract with other agencies, CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 1061-66 (West Supp. 1975), to acquire sites for the construction of new school
facilities, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1041 (West Supp. 1975), and to prescribe rules for the gov-
ernment and discipline of the schools under the jurisdiction it serves. CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 1052 (West Supp. 1975); but see Myers v. Arcata Union High School Dist., 269 Cal.
App. 2d 549, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969).
Although these examples are drawn entirely from the statutory powers accorded to
California boards of education, the functions are common to most education code man-
dates in the United States. See generally LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 44.
57. See, e.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE § 103 1(a) (c) (West Supp. 1975).
The state of Arkansas, where the Wood case originated, prescribes a similar require-
ment for its boards of education. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-509 (1967).
58. A teacher's right to due process of law is not significantly different from that of
the student. See generally notes 18 & 24 supra and accompanying text. With respect
to substantive due process, the right to employment has not often been found to be a
compensable property right. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (non-
tenured teacher has no property right to continued employment). Cf. Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher with actual or de facto tenure has legal pro.
prietary interest in continued employment); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207-08
(1971) (teacher recently hired without tenure but with clear promise of continued em-
ployment could not be dismissed without hearing).
However, courts have not been hesitant to find that teachers do possess a number of
substantive constitutional rights, the violation of which will warrant a claim for injunc-
tive or monetary relief. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
(teachers may not be compelled to relinquish their constitutional right to free speech
under the first amendment); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1968)
(teachers have right of free association to join a union of their choice); Smith v. Board
of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966) (teachers may not be discharged from employ-
ment on the basis of race).
As far as procedural due process is concerned, those teachers possessing tenure enjoy
basically the same rights to notice and opportunity to be heard as do students. See Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). If, however, the teacher does not have either ac-
tual or de facto tenure, and no enforceable promise for continued employment, there can
be no compensable claim for procedural due process violations in employment termina-
tions. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, the Supreme Court
noted specifically that procedural due process rights depend upon an initial substantive
protectable interest:
The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of in-
terests encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and
property. When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior
hearing is paramount. But the range of interests protected by procedural due proc-
ess is not infinite.
Id. at 569-70,
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maker, he has a legal commitment 9 to provide the most beneficial
learning experiences practicably attainable for every student"0 in the
district in which he is elected to serve.
Certainly with a role as varied as this, the doctrine of qualified
immunity which evolved at common law61 and which the Supreme
Court has extended to these officials0 2 serves a useful purpose,
as commentators have repeatedly suggested in the years prior to the
Wood decision.63  There appear to be four distinct advantages to ex-
tending qualified immunity to such officials: (1) the need to free
officials from vexatious suits; (2) the unfairness of asking a person to
make a difficult decision and then holding him liable for the decision he
makes; (3) the delay that accompanies these lawsuits; and (4) the fear
that such suits will hamper the efficiency of the school board policy-
making unit.64
On the other hand, it has been argued with equal persuasiveness65
59. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1071 (West Supp. 1975) gives a school board power to pro-
mote educational advancement.
60. Most education codes provide that the school board, so far as possible, devote
equal energies and resources to every school within its jurisdiction. See, e.g., CAL. EDuc.
CODE § 1054 (West Supp. 1975).
61. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 n.9.
62. Id. at 319-20.
63. See, e.g., Note, Doctrine of Official. Immunity, supra note 1 at 1235-36; Note,
Damages Under § 1983, supra note 7, at 529-30.
64. Note, Damages Under § 1983, supra note 7, at 522. The rationales advanced
herein are not materially different from those used to cloak any governmental officers
with immunity at common law. See generally Note, Doctrine of Official Immunity,
supra note 1. At least one commentator has suggested that there should be a uniform
application in the courts of an objective test of- good faith.
[A] uniform identifiable standard has not evolved in the application of the "good
faith" doctrine of immunity in this area. The ambiguous character of the principle
can no doubt be attributed to the application of common law immunity to § 1983
despite the specific policy consideration arising under that statute. Parochial defini-
tions of common law immunity have made the legislative mandate [of section 1983]
depend upon the forum in which the suit is brought.
Comment, The Defense of Good Faith Under § 1983, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 660, 671
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Defense of Good Faith].
Presumably the Supreme Court has provided just such a "uniform objective standard,"
to which lower courts must now adhere. It is unclear, however, whether the Court has
,sufficiently delineated a workable standard for determining precisely what actions will
constitute "good faith" or "bad faith." See notes 70-106 infra, and accompanying text.
65. Goss. v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624.(1943); Predv. Board of Pub.-Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969);
Comment, Immunity of School Board Members,'supra note 36, at 828-29. Cf. Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), where the Court
noted that only if board members are able to anticipate "substantial disruption or ma-
terial interference with school activities" may they restrict students' freedom of expression
to wear black armbands. Th=-zCourt.oemphasized' that- "n[inorder for -the State
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that school board members cannot simply invoke the excuse of "discre-
tionary judgment" in order to violate the constitutional rights of others.
One particularly strong argument was raised by the United States Su-
preme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette:66
The Fourteenth Amendment as now applied to the States, protects the
citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Edu-
cation not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform
within the limits of the Bill of Rights.
7
In order to insure that individual members of local boards of educa-
tion do not abuse their inherently discretionary powers, the section 1983
remedy is available; its coercive sanction of damages provides a more
powerful weapon against future violations by individual board members
than does injunctive relief.65 In each personal liability suit filed against
a board member, the federal courts have faced the task of determining
whether the existence of "good faith" warranted a defense of qualified
immunity. In so doing, they have failed to agree on precisely what
actions satisfy the nebulous requirement of "good faith.""' The poten-
tially powerful effect that the standard enunciated in Wood v. Strickland
will have upon these determinations merits a closer examination of the
Wood standard and its ramifications in light of the existing case law.
III. THE STANDARD OF GOOD FAITH
The scope of the immunity test to be applied to school board mem-
bers in an action brought pursuant to section 1983 "is not a question
which the lower federal courts have answered with a single voice."70 A
survey of the case law indicates that a variety of different standards have
been utilized at different times and under different circumstances."1 The
in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression
of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than
a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an un-
popular viewpoint" Id. at 509.
66. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
67. Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
68. For a broad overview of this rationale see Note, Damages Under § 1983, supra
note 7, at 520-23, where it is noted that individual board members may be hesitant to
risk their personal financial status and will therefore be more likely to investigate all
possible constitutional ramifications before making an important decision. Cf. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). See also Berch, supra note 6, at 50.
69. See note 64 supra.
70. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 315.
71. See note 64 supra; notes 81-107 infra and accompanying text.
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standard which the Supreme Court adopts in Wood v. Strickland,
however, appears to go far beyond the perimeters of existing case law, 2
72. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), for example, a less demanding im-
munity standard was fashioned by the Supreme Court for the Governor and Adjutant
General of Ohio. The standard in Scheuer encompassed a purely "subjective" approach
to analyzing the actions of the officials. The Court stated:
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief, that affords a basis for
qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official
conduct.
Id. at 247-48.
The Court said nothing about the Governor of Ohio accounting for his conduct on
the basis of the "basic, unquestioned constitutional rights" of the students involved in
the Kent State demonstrations. Rather, the Court allowed for a qualified immunity de-
fense on the basis of a reasonable belief that the surrounding circumstances justified the
decision-whether or not it ultimately passed constitutional scrutiny. Certainly, the
constitutional rights which the Kent State students possessed were no less important than
those of the students in the Wood case; in the former situation it was their very lives
which hung in the balance, while in the latter it was merely the right to obtain their
education without invalid and procedurally inadequate interruption.
In the school context, most federal courts have been reluctant to impose a standard
of good faith that requires more than a reasonable belief that the action taken by the
board member is warranted. See Simcox v. Board of Educ., 443 F.2d 40, 44-45 (7th
Cir. 1971) where the court of appeals held that board members were immune from
liability for dismissal of a teacher because they had justifiable grounds for believing that
the teacher had refused to cooperate with school administrators. Once again, no men-
tion is made of whether the board members were aware of either the substantive due
process rights of the teacher to continued employment (the record indicates that he was
tenured, see note 58 supra), or the requisites for complying with procedural due process
mandates. Presumably, under the language of the Court in Wood, the board members
in Sincox would have been held to conduct which conformed to the teacher's "clearly
established constitutional rights." It is doubtful that the Simcox court intended the
scope of the "good faith justifiable grounds" test to mandate such knowledge.
So too, in Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the teacher's first and
fourteenth amendment rights had been violated, but concluded that the members of the
Utah Board of Education were immune from liability because the dismissal had been ef-
fectuated on "justifiable grounds." If the constitutional infractions were so patently ob-
vious to the court, why did they not impute that observation to the common knowledge
of the board members involved? Apparently, the court did not intend to impose such a
degree of constitutional awareness upon Utah's elected educational officials. Presum-
ably, the Supreme Court of the United States now wishes to do so.
Some courts have even de-emphasized the requirement that the board members demon-
strate that they acted on justifiable grounds by shifting the burden of proof to the plain-
tiff to demonstrate that the officials acted in bad faith. See Roberts v. Williams, 456
F.2d 819, 831 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1972); Briscoe v. Kusper, 435
F.2d 1046, 1058 (7th Cir. 1973). In these cases, the courts certainly mandated no more
than that the board members not act in bad faith (which might be equated with the
"malicious intent" aspect of the Wood standard, see note 27 supra, and accompanying
text); requiring them to onform their conduct to the precise tenets of the Constitution
(as ultimately defined by the judiciary) was not considered.
Thus, it appears that the Wood decision 'carries the requirement for establishing good
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by mandating that the board member will now be accountable for
conduct "based not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowl-
edge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges. '7 3
Although the majority opinion denies that the imposition of this partial-
ly objective standard74 will force the school board member to predict
"the future course of constitutional law, 5 the Court appears to be
equating "good faith" in this context with a knowledge of "clearly
established constitutional rights. 170  This standard is certainly no less
demanding than prior judicial delineations of "good faith, 7  and the
majority opinion leaves room for speculation that courts may indeed
require the average board member to remain abreast of emerging con-
stitutional interpretations by the judiciary. 8
faith to an extent not before considered by many federal courts. The opinion leaves
open to speculation, however, exactly what degree of knowledge of constitutional princi-
ples school board members will be held to in future cases.
73. 420 U.S. at 322.
74. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
75. 420 U.S. at 322, citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
76. Id. The majority opinion emphasizes that "[a] compensatory award will be ap-
propriate only if the school board member has acted with such an impermissible motiva-
tion or with such disregard of the students' clearly established constitutional rights that
his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith." The Court fails
to make it clear, however, whether the "clearly established" rights refer only to those
specifically delineated in the Constitution, or whether varying judicial interpretations of
the guarantees incorporated into the "liberty" and "property" concepts of the four-
teenth amendment due process clause. It is one thing to hold a publicly elected official
to a broad knowledge of the words of the Constitution, and quite another to hold him
responsible for reading and grasping the fine distinctions between the broad constitu-
tional concepts with which appellate courts grapple in their opinions. See notes 18, 24,
& 58 supra, and accompanying text.
77. See generally Comment, Defense of Good Faith, supra note 64.
78. See notes 127-31 infra and accompanying text. In the area of "substantive due
process" alone, case law expanding and constricting these rights conflicts to such an ex-
tent that a board member would constantly be forced to read appellate opinions for the
most recent interpretations. The Wood opinion leaves this problem entirely open to
speculation, by utilizing the vague terminology "basic, unquestioned constitutional
rights." Unquestioned by whom? Does the Court mean principles which are unques-
tioned by judges? By lawyers? By laypersons? These will be the nagging questions
facing the lower federal courts as they seek to apply the Wood standard to applicable
factual situations.
While it is probably unlikely that the present Court intended to open up a flood of
litigation against school board members, seeking to hold them to knowledge of many
of the esoteric and minute nuances of constitutional law, it was incumbent upon the
Court to express its intentions in more precise language. It is conceivable that lower
courts will have difficulty in defining the extent of knowledge that board members will
be expected to possess. This is particularly so because we do hold officials in other
areas of the government to knowledge of emerging doctrines of law.
Police officers, for example, are held to a knowledge of the judicial interpretations
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The difficulty in devising a uniform standard of good faith in the
lower courts stems from the basic disagreement over whether the inquiry
should concentrate on the particular official's subjective state of mind,7
or whether a more demanding standard of objective reasonableness
should be employed."0
Examples of differing situations where a "good faith" immunity
defense was upheld demonstrate the extent to which lower courts have
refused to agree on a definitive standard of conduct. Some courts, for
instance, have simply concluded that if the board as a whole acted
dealing with police conduct in the areas of fourth, fifth and sixth amendment rights.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (what facts constitute voluntary
waiver of fourth amendment right to be free from unwarranted search must be known
by police officer conducting the search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(police held to knowledge of permissible scope of search incident to lawful arrest);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (what facts known to the police officer will justify
a pat down search of a suspect); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police re-
quired to inform criminal suspects of their fifth and sixth amendment rights before arrest
or interrogation).
For further amplification concerning the potential problems with the Court's standard
of good faith, see notes 105-28 infra and accompanying text.
79. Some courts, for example, have defined the standard to be simply a good faith
exercise of discretion, depending upon the subjective state of mind of the particular
board member at the time the alleged constitutional infraction occurred. See Briscoe
v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046, 1057 (7th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177, 181
(4th Cir. 1966). Under this rationale, it does not matter whether the "reasonable per,
son" would have known that the action being taken would violate the Constitution, or
whether the reasonable person acting in such a manner would have been presumed to
have a malicious intention. Rather, the court must look only at the state of mind of
the defendant board member-what did he know? What did he think? What did he
do? See note 26 supra.
80. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1968) where the
court imposed a standard under which qualified immunity would only be accorded to
a board member if he or she could demonstrate that the official action was supported
by "justifiable grounds." See also Simcox v. Board of Educ., 443 F.2d 40 (7th Cir.
1971); Young v. Coder, 346 F. Supp. 165 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Kirstein v. Rector and Visi.
tors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970). Each of these cases calls
for objective evaluation by the trier of fact of the reasonableness of the defendant board
members' official activities. Thus, the court will determine what the "reasonably pru-
dent person" would have done or believed when the action was taken, and will hold the
board member to that standard of conduct. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
The Wood doctrine appears to go beyond the "reasonable person" objective stand-
ard by mandating even a basic knowledge of constitutional principles; for surely
courts would not seek to hold an elected official of the community-who possesses no
qualifications beyond being of voting age in the district, see note 117 infra-to educa-
tional standards which would be impossible to meet. If this is so, the difficulty in deter-
mining whether the "reasonable school board member" is different from the "reasonable
person" becomes readily apparent, as most board members are no more than civic-
minded individuals. See notes 110-26 infra and accompanying text.
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honestly and fairly in the exercise of its discretionary powers, 81 the
individual member cannot be held liable for any official misconduct,
regardless of his particular state of mind.82 In seeking to balance
students' and teachers' constitutional rights against the state's interest in
maintaining the effectiveness of its educational process"' some lower
courts have been hesitant to find "bad faith" in even the most outra-
geous factual circumstances. One blatant example is Byrd v. Gary8 4 in
which several students sought an injunction under section 1983 to
restrain the school board from expelling them for attempting to organize
a boycott of the school cafeteria.8 5 The court found no indication in the
record that the board members had taken the action against these
particular students with a discriminatory motive.88 Concluding that
such an act of discretion is not assailable under the Civil Rights Act, the
court stated:
The approach of granting immunity to government officials for discre-
tionary acts done within the scope of their authority, seems a proper
one. Without the presence of a particular discriminatory intent they
have no liability in any event. This approach says we will not inquire
... into their state of mind where they are exercising a discretionary
Sfunction.87
It should be noted that the Byrd court was dealing only with a request
for injunctive relief; it may well have applied a different standard had
the plaintiffs been seeking damages from the individual board members.
There have been situations, however, where courts have sought to tip the
balance in favor of defendants sued for damages under section 1983,8
81. See notes 46-59 supra and accompanying text.
82. Brooks v. School Dist., 267 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894
(1959); Ward v. Board of Regents, 138 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1905); Brown v. Greer, 296
F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
83. Many courts have emphasized the need for striking such a balance. See, e.g.,
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.5. 503, 507 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
84. 184 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.S.C. 1960).
85. This would appear to be a clear violation of the constitutional right to freedom
of expression, particularly because the case occurred before Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969), in which the Court held that restrictions on freedom
of expression were permissible, but only if the board could forecast substantial disruption
of the school atmosphere.
86. 184 F. Supp. at 391.
87. Id. at 391-92, citing Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 300 (9th Cir. 1959).
88. Most courts have been uniform in denying immunity in an injunctive relief set-
ting. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Baker,
339 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 969 (1958); Schreiber v. Joint School Dist. No. 1,
335 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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leaving room for speculation that the Byrd court might have devised
an equally lax standard for assessing the board members' actions in a
damage suit setting. 9
Still other courts have applied a restrictive definition of activities
constituting a defense of good faith. In McLaughlin v. Tilendis,90 for
example, two former probationary teachers brought a section 1983
action against both the Superintendent and the board alleging an infrac-
tion of their rights to associate with a union of their choice. The court
of appeals held that a defense of qualified immunity on the part of the
board members could be sustained only if they assumed the burden of
proof that the teachers were discharged on justifiable grounds.9 1 The
court never specifically stated, however, exactly what subjective criteria
were necessary to establish "justifiable grounds." In Smith v. Losee,9"
on the other hand, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a
situation in which an Associate Professor at a Junior College was
dismissed because of his involvement in a local political campaign.
93
The court there, placed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs, requiring
them to demonstrate that in light of all of the surrounding circum-
stances, the school board members could not reasonably have been
At the same time, the tendency has been to give the individual board member every
benefit of the doubt before assessing monetary damages. In McDonough v. Kelly, 329
F. Supp. 144 (D.N.H. 1971), for example, the court found that a board member who
cast the deciding vote for dismissal of a teacher without having attended the hearing
was nevertheless immune from damages. While the court clearly expressed the belief
that such action violated both the due process clause, and the right to a full and fair
hearing under an applicable New Hampshire statute, it nevertheless refused to apply the
damage remedy against the board members as individuals. Although the court never
stated precisely why it felt that damages were inappropriate-beyond the statement that
the action did not evidence bad faith-it is probable that the court considered the rem-
edy too harsh in light of the rationale behind the immunity doctrine. See generally
Note, Subordinate State Officials, supra note 1, at 887-89; Note, Doctrine of Official
Immunity, supra note 1, at 1231-33.
89. If the result in McDonough v. Kelly, 329 F. Supp. 144 (D.N.H. 1971) is any
indication of the predilections of the lower courts, it is unlikely that the remedy of dam-
ages would be invoked more freely than that of injunctive relief. See note 85 supra and
accompanying text.
90. 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
91. Id. at 290-91.
92. 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
93. Id. at 336-37. The administration at the college charged among other things, -that
Professor Smith was acting in an unprofessional manner by using the name of the col-
lege Young Democrats organization to conduct a smear campaign against an incumbent
state senator. Moreover, it was alleged that Smith held an "anti-administration" atti-
tude, and attempted to persuade the student body to protest tie misappropriation of stu-
dent funds by the college administration. See Comment, Immunity of School Board
Members, supra note 36, at 820 n.2. - -
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acting in good faithY4 The court, implying that the board members
could rely totally on the recommendations of the President of the
College-apparently without conducting an investigation into the truth
behind the allegations-failed to specify exactly how far the board mem-
bers could have gone before their actions would have constituted bad
faith.95
Finally, a survey of the cases in which the courts have labeled the
board members' actions as constituting "bad faith" demonstrates still
greater disparity and confusion.96 What is clear, however, is that none
of the standards fashioned by lower courts-even those which seek to
objectify the inquiry on a broader level of reasonableness-purport to
go as far as does the Supreme Court in mandating a standard of
knowledgeable conduct to which board members must conform.9 7 A
particularly blatant example of this problem arose in McDonough v,
Kelly. 98  The action was brought by a teacher against the board mem-
bers individually, alleging that her dismissal was conducted without due
process of law. The district court held that the fact that one board
member-who was not present at the initial dismissal hearing-eventu-
ally cast the deciding vote not to renew the teacher's contract constituted
a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment.9 9 However, the
court concluded that damages could not be assessed against the individ-
94. 485 F.2d at 352.
95. Id.
96. See Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1970) (court found that school authorities unjustifiably expelled two high school stu-
dents for distributing at school a newspaper written off campus that was critical of
school administration, because it denied freedom of speech with no evidence of imminent
substantial disruption of school discipline); Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.
1969) (court strikes down validity of administrative sanctions which the school board
used to expel University of Wisconsin students, because the alleged "misconduct" had
no basis in any clearly established pre-existing rules defining an acceptable standard of
conduct); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966) (minor infractions allegedly
committed by teacher with a spotless record spanning twelve years including failure to
stand at door of her classroom between classes and failure to clean cabinets in her class-
room did not justify board decision not to renew her teaching contract); Jones v. Jeffer-
son County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Tenn. 1972) (board members acted
in bad faith by making unwarranted defamatory charge against a teacher where their
finding of guilt without adequate investigation made it impossible for the teacher to ac-
quire another teaching position). See also Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.
1966).
97. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
98. 329 F. Supp. 144 (D.N.H. 1971).
99. The findings of fact by the district court indicated that not only was there a con-
stitutional infraction, but also a violation of a New Hampshire statute requiring a full
and fair hearing. See N.H. Rlv. STAT. ANr. ch. 189:14 (1967).
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ual board members because their action had been undertaken in "good
faith."100
An application of the Wood standard could conceivably alter the
outcome of the McDonough case. The trial court condemned what it
labeled the "blatant" constitutional violation in unequivocal language:
It does not require any extended citation of authority to rule that it is
a fundamental denial of one's constitutional right to due process of law
to allow one who has not been present at the hearing to cast the de-
ciding vote on the very issue which was the subject matter of the hear-
ing. To rule otherwise would make a hearing requirement meaning-
less.101
By utilizing the word "fundamental" to describe the right to have one
who will eventually sit in judgment present at the hearing, the court is
expressing the belief that such procedural due process constitutes basic,
unquestioned constitutional law. This is precisely the mandate for
knowledge on the part of the board member prescribed by Wood v.
Strickland.02 Nevertheless, the district court concludes that "[w]hile
the very procedure of Dr. Lionos [the absent board member] . . . is
shocking to one trained in the law, it does not constitute such bad faith
as to render him .. individually liable in damages . . ,.0. Appar-
ently, the court did not feel compelled to require that board members be
"trained in the law." Whether the decision in Wood v. Strickland
represents a radical departure from the district court's analysis is open to
speculation.
Because the factual circumstances in McDonough portray such a
flagrant picture of unfairness, it would probably be safe to assume that
most "reasonable" individuals would find the procedure to be improper.
It is unrealistic, however, to assume that they would be able to label it
unconstitutional, or even to offer proposed alternatives to conform it to
what is believed to be a proper or "fair" procedure. 0 4 To the extent
that it is blatantly unfair, the Wood standard would justifiably allow for a
finding of "bad faith" and a consequent denial of immunity. However,
it is not entirely inconceivable to assume that other courts may find such
action unjustified under the circumstances, and deny immunity on a
standard less stringent than that proposed in Wood. The question that
arises is whether in cases where the factual circumstances do not demon-
100. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
101. 329 F. Supp. at 150 (emphasis added).
102. 420 U.S. at 322. See also notes 18 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
103. 329 F. Supp. at 150-51.
104, See notes 18 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
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strate such an obvious abuse of discretion, the Wood standard would
impose a requirement of knowledge of constitutional principles which
are less well defined.' 0 5  Basically, the issue is: if the reasonable
person'0° would not be aware of any overt constitutional improprieties,
is the Court saying that the reasonable school board member should
be?'
07
IV. POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING THE
WOOD STANDARD
The divergent definitions and applications of the "good faith" stan-
dard which are rampant in the lower federal court decisions indicate that
no clearcut criteria have yet been articulated to judge the behavior of the
individuals who control state and local schools.' 08 To the extent that
the Wood decision attempts to establish uniformity, it is a desirable
development; one that has been long overdue. 00 However, the broad
language of the majority opinion raises several areas of difficulty in
applying the standard to potential factual situations.
A. What is the "Reasonable School Board Member?"
A careful reading of the majority opinion indicates that the Court
wishes to draw a distinction between what the average person
is expected to know about constitutional principles, and what the public-
ly elected school board member will be required to understand. The
Court states:
To be entitled to a special exemption from the categorical remedial
language of § 1983 in a case in which his action violated a student's
constitutional rights, a school board member, who has voluntarily
undertaken the task of supervising the operation of the school and the
activities of the students, must be held to a standard of conduct based
not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the basic,
unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges."10
The italicized language appears to indicate that the school board
member, as one who undertakes a special role in the governmental
105. See generally notes 18, 24 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 26 & 80 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 70-102 supra and accompanying text.
109. This is particularly so in light of the recent advances in defining the substantive
and procedural rights which school children are to enjoy under the constitution. See
generally notes 18 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
110. 420 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added)...
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structure, may be required to be aware of constitutional principles which
are beyond the common understanding of the "reasonable person."
Much of the difficulty in discerning exactly what the Court is requiring
stems from uncertainty about what are basic unquestioned constitutional
rights.111 If they are "rights" which the average layperson is presumed
to know, then the standard will have negligible effect, because a board
member who purposefully evades principles of such pervasive common
knowledge could not reasonably be found to be acting in good faith
under existing case law definitions. 112 If, on the other hand, such
"rights" involve knowledge of principles beyond those found within the
realm of common knowledge, the Court may be devising a standard of
"reasonable conduct" for school board members which diverges from
the standard of reasonable conduct of the average layperson.11 3 Indeed,
it appears that the Court did mean to impose a standard of conduct
for board members which requires a higher degree of knowledge than
that possessed by the average layperson."1
4
While such a requirement is neither unprecedented,11 5 nor unjusti-
fied,116 a difficult problem stems from the fact that school board mem-
bers are in reality ordinary laypersons; they need not possess any special
qualifications before assuming office.11 7 It hardly seems appropriate to
111. See notes 127-30 infra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 90-94 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 26 & 80 supra and accompanying text.
114. Board members are "entrusted with the supervision of students' daily lives
." 420 U.S. at 321. They have "voluntarily undertaken the task of supervising
the operation of the school and the activities of the students." Id. at 322. They are
therefore required to meet a standard which "neither imposes an infair burden upon a
person assuming a responsible public office requiring a high degree of intelligence and
judgment for the proper fulfillment of its duties, nor an unwarranted burden in light of
the value which civil rights have in our legal system." Id.
115. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. The concept of the "reasonably pru-
dent person" as it arose in the area of tort law was flexible enough to embody the at-
tributes of the actor himself. Thus, one who possessed a special skill, or who had under-
gone preparatory education to assume a particular role was judged by the standard of
conduct of the "reasonable person" possessing those special characteristics. See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 161 (4th ed. 1971); note 28 supra and ac-
companying text.
116. Boards of education serve an extremely important function in our society; the
job of directing the operation of effectively educating a large segment of the nation's
population cannot be taken lightly. See generally CAMPBELL, CUNNINGHAM & McPHEE,
THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1965); H. LEVIN, COMMU-
NITY CONTROL OF SCHOOLS (1970) [hereinafter cited as LEVIN]; H. WHITE, LOCAL
SCHOOL BOARDS: ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICES (1962) [hereinafter cited as WHImTI.
117. Legal requirements for persons seeking to become board members are often sim-
ple to fulfill. In Arkansas, for instance, where the Wood case arose, the education code
requires only that the prospective board member be eligible to vote. ARK. STAT. ANN.
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require that average voters in a school district, who seek office because
they are concerned about the quality of education in their community,118
be assigned an added burden of becoming fully aware of every legal
ramification of the many decisions which they must make.11 It was for
the very reason of encouraging interested and energetic individuals to
assume the burdens of public office, that the defense of immunity was
born.12 To impose upon them a standard of knowledge beyond that of
the "reasonable person of ordinary prudence" who pervades the law of
torts, might unduly hamper the efficiency of school board operations, if
not deter enthusiastic individuals from seeking office.'
21
While requiring from our elected officials a commitment to learn
§ 80-504 (1967). Likewise, in California, the average layperson can seek election with-
out meeting a stringent set of requirements; no special education or experience is neces-
sitated. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1112 (West 1976) (requires a candidate to be 18
years of age, a citizen of the state, a resident of the school district and a registered
voter).
Moreover, because most school board members do not receive financial remuneration
for their endeavors, their role on the policy making unit is characterized more as an
"outside activity" than as a serious occupation. See SURVEY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN
THE MEMBER CITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF BIG CITY BOARDs OF EDUCATION 3, 15-21
(1968); WHITE, supra note 116, at 67-69. Thus, it is questionable whether the average
board member has the time, ability or inclination to read and grasp the nuances of con-
stitutional law for which the dissent in Wood fears that they will now be held account-
able. 420 U.S. at 427-29. This "is particularly the case because the sources available
to them for guidance when they assume their new roles are inadequate to help them deal
with such complex issues. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA SCHOOL BOARD ASSOCIATION, BOARDS-
MANSHIP: A GUIDE FOR THE SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER (1975).
118. It is safe to assume that a large number of prospective board members do possess
such altruistic motives, as the workload is heavy and the remuneration often inadequate
or non-existent. See WHrrE, supra note 116, at 67-69; cf. LEVIN, supra note 116, at 154-
59.
119. See generally LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 44.
120. See generally Note, Doctrine of Official Immunity, supra note 1.
121. The majority opinion in Wood does recognize the problems inherent in holding
board members fully responsible for errors in judgment which will inevitably occur, for
it notes that "lt]he most capable candidates for school board positions might be deterred
from seeking office if heavy burdens upon their private resources from monetary lia-
bility were a likely prospect during their tenure." 420 U.S. at 320.
The Court implies, however, that upon assuming office, board members should seek
to develop a "quasi-expertise" in areas of the law which they would not be expected to
encounter in their roles as voting citizens in the district. Certainly this in itself is not
an unfair burden for one "entrusted with supervision of students' daily lives," (id. at
321) to assume. It is to be expected that those individuals who seek public office-
whether it be executive, legislative or administrative-will attempt to develop a certain
amount of competence in the exercise of their duties, simply to make the governmental
entity itself function more effectively. Such an expectation is not unreasonable. How-
ever, requiring a standard of expertise for a "reasonable school board member," not re-
quired of a "reasonable citizen" will cause potential difficulties in enforcement of the
standard. See text accompanying notes 110-20 supra and 122-31 infra.
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from their experience the most effective and beneficial manner of exe-
cuting their duties is in itself a reasonable expectation, there are poten-
tial difficulties in applying a standard of conduct for the "reasonable
school board member." Will the courts require a greater amount of
legal expertise from a school board member who happens also to be an
attorney than they would from a board member who operates a busi-
ness? 12 2  If this is so, it is conceivable that one board member (for
instance, a lawyer) would be held liable for an unconstitutional action,
while another board member with less exposure to constitutional princi-
ples and appellate court interpretations of the Constitution would not be.
This would hardly fulfill the objective of the Court to adopt a uniform
"good faith" standard, since the result of a section 1983 action could
depend as much upon the personal educational characteristics of the
defendant board member as upon the forum in which the suit is
brought.
123
Moreover, will the board member be deemed more "reasonable" as he
gains more experience? If so, it would be possible to hold a board
member with a twelve year tenure to a greater degree of knowledge than
a board member who has served six months. Assuming that the term
"basic, unquestioned constitutional rights" was meant by the Court to
refer to the basic guarantees in the words of the Constitution itself (for
example, freedom of speech, freedom of religion), a distinction
based upon years of experience in office would not be unwarranted, as
we would expect an individual who has faced the job of conducting
board activities more often to have discovered what he is expected to
know long before the more recently elected members. However, be-
cause constitutional principles of due process change frequently with
varying judicial interpretations, 24 experience in office would be of little
import if board members were expected to remain abreast of new
appellate interpretations.' 25
Thus, while the Wood opinion is certainly justified in calling for a
certain degree of expertise in assuming an office of such great responsi-
bility, the Court fails to consider the practical difficulties of imposing an
objectified standard of knowledge on school board members who have
122. Borrowing the concept of the "reasonable person" from the law of torts, it would
appear that one who acquires special knowledge or skills does not shed them when they
are to be utilized in a different capacity, for the characteristics of the actor are uniquely
his, and all actions must be judged accordingly. W. PROSSER, HAND3OOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS, 151-52 (4th ed. 1971). See also notes 28, 78-80 supra and accompanying
text.
123. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 18, 24 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 127-30 infra and accompanying text.
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differing amounts of expertise and knowledge. Perhaps because of
the importance of assuring that public school students and teachers are
accorded every procedural and substantive right to which they are en-
titled, the requirements for seeking office should be raised to a minimum
level of educational or administrative experience. The responsibility for
changing the candidacy requirements lies with the legislature rather than
the courts. However, such a proposal would make a democratic com-
munity election difficult, particularly since no such requirements are
imposed upon individuals who seek higher elective office. 2 "
B. What constitutes "basic, unquestioned constitutional law?"
A second area of difficulty which the Court leaves unanswered is the
standard that a reviewing court is to apply in determining what is the
indisputable constitutional law of which the school board member is
now to be held knowledgeable. The dissent argues that the concept is
illusory, because even lawyers and judges cannot agree on the "settled
indisputable law.' 127  Should the school officials be charged with an
126. See LEviN, supra note 116. Arguably, if requirements for seeking positions on
school boards were suddenly raised, many interested, but less educated or experienced
members of the community would be barred from representation. The United States
Constitution does not mandate strict requirements of qualifications for either legislators
or the President. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (a Congressman must be 25 years
old, a citizen of the United States for seven years and an inhabitant of the state which
he or she is elected to represent); U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (the President must be
35 years old, a natural born citizen and a resident of the United States for fourteen
years). Surely, these offices require no less expertise and education than is necessary to
effectively operate the schools; it would be inappropriate to require a greater degree of
qualification for school board members.
127. 420 U.S. at 329. Referring to Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (Powell,
J., dissenting), the dissenting opinion calls attention to the fact that many vital constitu-
tional issues are decided by a vote of five to four in the Supreme Court of the United
States. One need look only to the numerous times that "landmark" constitutional inter-
pretations are later overruled by the same tribunal. The evolving area of crim-
inal procedure indicates that the concept of a "settled" doctrine of constitutional law
is not a practical reality. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth
amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right under the fourteenth amendment)
which overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (due process clause of fourteenth
amendment does not incorporate right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(exclusionary rule applies in state proceedings barring evidence seized unconstitution-
ally) which overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (exclusionary rule does
not apply in state proceedings); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal
protection of fourteenth amendment mandates that separate facilities for different races
is inherently unequal) which overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (the
Constitution does not prohibit use of "separate but equal" railway facilities for different
races).
Emerging interpretations of the scope of constitutional guarantees are, therefore, as
"settled" as the time that it takes to overrule a previous opinion. Thus, without keeping
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understanding of the intricacies of the judicial structure so that they can
give due weight to conflicting opinions from superior and inferior
tribunals? 128  At what point in time will the board member be held
accountable for awareness of new constitutional interpretations decided
by the courts? 129  Will a sincere reliance upon improper advice of
counsel constitute a valid defense? 3 ' It is interesting to note that the
abreast of recurring judicial opinions, board members can never be totally aware of what
the "law" is at any particular time. This has caused some commentators to critically
assess the difficulties of requiring governmental officials-such as school board members
-to conform their conduct to differing constitutional interpretations:
If damages are to be permitted against school officials, the argument places great
responsibility on the judiciary and on legislators to clearly articulate the guidelines
which are to be followed. For example, the meaning of "due process hearing"
should be well defined if administrators are to be held accountable for their failure
to fully provide such a forum.
Note, Damages Under § 1983, supra note 7, at 522-23.
128. It has been pointed out by some commentators that school board members can
turn only to statutes and court decisions in order to formulate standards and guidelines
for their own official conduct:
Where prior court determination of an issue is available, school board members are
in the same position as the lower administrative officials who seek advice from
the board. Where such advice is sought and given, immunity should exist, but
where unilateral action is taken and a constitutional right is violated, the conduct
should not be considered reasonable.
Comment, Damages Under § 1983, supra note 7, at 529-30.
What is the board member to do if, as is often the case, there are two differing inter-
pretations of the same basic issue by different tribunals? Should the average board mem-
ber be aware of which opinion is to be controlling? This problem has occurred before
in another area where constitutional interpretation by the judiciary is of vital importance
-fourth amendment violations. Compare Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) (the fact of a lawful custodial arrest alone justifies a full blown incidental search
of the arrestee) with People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 19 Cal. Rptr.
315 (1975) (California Supreme Court holds that lawful custodial arrest alone will not
make an incidental search valid). While logically it does not seem unreasonable to hold
California police officers to a knowledge of the California Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of its own constitution, so that they do not utilize the harsher federal standard of
Robinson, does this mean that school board members (who, unlike police officers, do
not hold a full time job where knowledge of such operating procedures is crucial) will
be required by Wood to discern which appellate opinion they must follow if the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court differ on a decision inter-
preting their respective due process clauses?
129. The Wood opinion is silent on the issue of whether or not a board member will
be expected to keep constantly abreast of new decisions, so that knowledge of changing
constitutional interpretations will be realized even before the opinion is published in the
reporter system. For example, must the school board member read the advance sheets
of the courts within the jurisdiction that he serves? When will basic constitutional prin-
ciples be regarded as sufficiently "settled" that knowledge of them will be expected?
While board members would probably not be called upon to read new appellate decisions
every two weeks, or even every two months, the Court leaves the problem open to spec-
ulation--and open to the whims of the lower federal courts-by not specifying what is
meant by the term "settled" constitutional law.
130. The criminal law has tended to allow reasonable mistakes of law to constitute
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dissent raises this latter point specifically, warning that the majority is
equating "actual malice" with an ignorance of the law, necessitating that
a school official "will now act at the peril of some judge or jury
subsequently finding that a good faith belief as to the applicable law was
mistaken and hence actionable.""'.
These are all vital questions which remain unanswered by the majori-
ty opinion, and which must be resolved before the standard enunciated
by the Court can become a workable framework within which to assess
the actions of an individual school board member in a personal liability
action brought pursuant to section 1983. It is still too early for the
lower court case law to reflect the approach to the "good faith" standard
enunciated in Wood v. Strickland.
There have been relatively few cases dealing with the express issue of
what constitutes "good faith" for a defense of qualified immunity since
the Wood case was decided. The cases which have considered the new
qtualified immunity standard generally do not present an optimistic
outlook for school board members. In Thonen v. Jenkins1 2 for exam-
ple, two university students who were disciplined because of a letter
published in a school newspaper brought a section 1983 action seeking
correction of their academic records, readmission, monetary damages
and attorneys fees. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing the
Wood case, remanded to the district court for a determination on the
issue of the officials' qualified immunity from damages. The court
noted that the appropriate test now involves inquiry into objective as
well as subjective good faith, and that the district court had addressed
only the issue of subjective good faith. What the district court will find
is clearly open to speculation; however, it is apparent that the court of
appeals was hesitant to affirm the trial court finding of immunity even
though the record indicated that the university officials took their action
in the sincere belief that they were acting correctly.13
3
A potentially very significant case is Bright v. Los Angeles Unified
School District'34 not so much for its position on the issue of immunity,
a defense to actions which require a particular mental element. See Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559 (1965). Cf. People v. McCalla, 63 Cal. App. 783, 220 P. 436 (1923).
Once again the question is left unanswered: must a school board member seek advice
of counsel before every imiaportant decision, and if so, will the board member be held
accountable if that advice is erroneous?
131. 420 U.S. at 322.
132. 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975).
133. Id. at 5-6.
134. 124 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Ct. App. 1975), alf'd, No. 30555 (Cal. Supreme Court,
Dec. 6, 1976).
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as for its apparent willingness to hold a school official (principal of
high school) to knowledge of constitutional principles which are presum-
ably beyond the realm of common knowledge. The action was brought
by a high school student for an injunction to prevent school officials from
interfering with her distribution of an underground newspaper prepared
by students. The complaint also sought declaratory and monetary
relief. The principal had banned the distribution of the newspaper
on the ground that it contained material which was libelous against
a particular school official. The California court of appeal held
that the use of prior restraint on the ground that the proposed publica-
tion contained "facially libelous" material violated due process because
the principal had determined that the article in question was libelous
solely on the basis of assurances by the school administrators that it was
false. The significance of the court's opinion lies in its determination
that the principal was unjustified in not extending his inquiry into the
truth or falsity of the article, as he did not determine before exercising
his censorship of the publication whether the article was conditionally
privileged. The court of appeal applied a stringent requirement of
"legal knowledge" to which the principal was bound to conform by
stating:
Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the California
Constitution before the distribution of the summer 1974 issue of "The
Red Tide" on the University High School campus could be constitu-
tionally prevented by Principal Welch on the ground that it contained
libelous material, he had to make a 'fundamentally fair' and reason-
ably complete (considering 'the stringent limitations of time) investi-
gation to determine whether the facially libelous material was libelous
"according to legal standards."'135
The court concluded that the principal did not comply with such
standards because his factual inquiry into the truth or falsity of the
article in dispute was too limited and because he made no independent
investigation into whether the distribution of such material might be
conditionally privileged. 138  Presumably, in order for him to determine
whether the material was conditionally privileged, the principal would
have been compelled to be aware of the standard enunciated in New
York Times v. Sullivan,3 7 (i.e. the students would have had to know of
135. Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 604-05.
137. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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the falsity of their statements or have acted with reckless disregard for
the truth).
Although the court of appeal failed to refer to the Wood case (appar-
ently because no immunity problems were directly at issue it is not un-
likely that this same court would hold a school board member to a sim-
ilar degree of knowledge of particular constitutional principles. The
only distinguishing factor in the Bright situation was the existence of a
statute which provided that public school students have a right to exer-
cise free expression in printed materials, with the exception that expres-
sion which is libelous according to current legal standards is prohibited.' 38
The existence of this statute, which apparently places a heavy burden
upon school administrators to ascertain what is libelous and what is not
(according to current legal standards) does not negate the distinct
possibility that a school board member would also be held to a determi-
nation of the law of libel at the particular time if a suspension was being
considered rather than a prior restraint.
In Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School District,'30 a pregnant teacher
brought an action for damages because she had been excluded from sick
leave coverage. Although the court found that the board members had
not acted in bad faith under the Wood standard, it emphasized the fact
that the board members had sought and relied upon the advice of the
State Director of Legal and Executive Services. The court notes, also,
that the board members were justified in concluding that they were not
disregarding "settled, indisputable law" since "the courts themselves
have been split as to whether or not pregnancy may permissibly be
excluded from sick leave coverage.1' 140  Thus, while the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals did not interpret the Wood standard to be so stringent
that it barred a defense of immunity in this context, it implied that had
the court opinions not been conflicting, and had the board not relied
upon legal advice, the existence of good faith may well have been deter-
mined differently. The court never explicitly stated that the board
members were free to exercise their own sincere judgment as to the good
faith of their actions (as previous case law allows); 14' rather, they were
apparently expected to seek legal advice on the state of the existing case
law interpreting the extent of due process connected with pregnancy
disabilities. Happily for the board, even though the advice of the State
138. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10611 (West Supp. 1975); see also 124 Cal. Rptr. at 601-
02.
139. 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975).
140. Id. at 968.
141. See, e.g., Brown v. Greer, 296 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
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Director of Legal and Executive Services was erroneous (as the board
actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act), their attempt to
solicit such an opinion placed their action within the realm of "good
faith."1 42
In Sapp v. Renfroe143 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced
with an action for damages against school board members brought by a
student who had been expelled because he refused to attend ROTC
meetings. In concluding that the defendants could maintain a claim of
qualified immunity, the court noted that
[w]hile determining that a constitutional right is "clearly established,"
or is "basic" and "unquestioned" is likely to prove an onerous burden
for the Board, . . . we believe that Sapp's freedom from attending
ROTC was not a clearly established constitutional right.'
44
The basis upon which the court concluded that Sapp's conscientious
objector status was not a constitutional right is unclear. However, its
unwillingness to hold the defendants liable for damages indicates that at
least one circuit is willing to read the Wood standard of "unquestioned
constitutional law" rather loosely.
Finally, in Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh,'45 several plaintiffs,
who had successfully challenged a state university rule under which the
residency of married female students, for purposes of tuition, was deter-
mined by looking to the residency of their husbands, moved for attor-
neys fees. The court of appeals concluded that
[f]rom the outset counsel has contended and this Court has found that
the presumption of a married female student's domicile which this
Court previously struck down was a rule of the Auditor General of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which the three defendant Uni-
versities, by virtue of their financial and administrative relationship
with the Commonwealth, were obliged to have on their books if not
follow. . .. The Universities will not be held to have acted in
bad faith where their administration of the Auditor General's rule was
nondiscretionary throughout the period in question.1
46
The factual circumstances in Samuel were clearly distinguishable
from the discretionary role that the board members played in Wood.
The court, by its explicit language referring to the University officials'
ministerial duties, leaves open to speculation whether or not they would
142. See note 131 supra.
143. 511 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1975).
144. Id. at 176.
145. 395 F. Supp. 1275 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
146. Id. at 1284.
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have been held to a more stringent standard had they been faced with a
policy decision of their own making.
Whether or not the potential difficulties that have been raised in this
Comment will pose a serious obstacle for school board members is open
to speculation. However, the decision clears the way for the possibility
of a large number of suits being filed against board members under
section 1983.147 This alone may create a potential problem for the
efficient maintenance of school district operations. Board members-
even if eventually able to prevail on a defense of qualified immunity-
may be forced to spend an inordinate amount of time simply answering
charges that are filed.1
48
If the coparts are going to be more amenable to holding board mem-
bers accountable for violating the rights of students and teachers,1"'
there should be some vehicle available for insuring that only the most
meritorious claims reach the point of litigation in the federal courts.
The answer that has been devised by some courts to deal with both the
interests of the party seeking redress and the official sued under section
1983 has been the requirement that the plaintiff exhaust all available
administrative and judicial remedies before seeking relief under the
Federal Civil Rights Act. 5 °
It is unclear whether the students in the Wood case sought to exhaust
their administrative remedies; the Court did not consider the issue.
From the point of view of the board member, however, it appears to be
an extremely important consideration. If board actions which are
unjustified in light of the surrounding circumstances can be examined
and ultimately corrected before the possibility of lengthy litigation aris-
es, the party seeking redress can be satisfied, and the board member can
avoid the possibility of monetarily compensating for the unwarranted
invasion of constitutional rights."5 On the other hand, if the action has
147. A greater accessibility to potentially successful compensatory awards may make
the damage remedy a more attractive vehicle for students and teachers than it has been
in the past. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
148. The avoidance of just such a demand on the time, energy and resources of the
public official was the motivating factor behind the immunity doctrine. See notes 34-
36 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text. The rise in interest in student con-
stitutional rights has led to a concomitant interest in seeing that those rights are en-
forced.
150. Case law clearly indicates that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a factor
to be weighed in the section 1983 setting. See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S.
668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748 (1st
Cir. 1973).
151. The Supreme Court noted this particular advantage in Parisi v. Davidson, 405
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created a severe hardship for the party seeking relief, he may wish to
seek damages under section 1983 in any event, without undergoing the
delay of exhausting his administrative remedies initially.' 52  The rea-
sonableness of both positions is not open to serious question, but the
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies has posed a con-
troversy in the federal courts,15 3 and certainly is one that must be
considered in the context of civil rights actions against members of
boards of education.' 54
U.S. 34 (1972):
The basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency
to perform functions within its special competence, to make a factual record, to
apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies.
Id. at 37.
152. Because no monetary compensation is ordinarily provided in an administrative
proceeding, the plaintiff may wish to proceed in federal court even if ultimately satisfied
by the administrative decree of reinstatement or expunction of records. For example,
it does little good to reinstate a student who has missed an entire year of school and
must undergo remedial measures, perhaps forfeiting the opportunity to graduate at the
expected date. See Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d at 188 n.l. Under these circum-
stances, compensatory and punitive damages may be in order, and it would be meaning-
less to require a lengthy procedure through the administrative maze which would facili-
tate nothing but an increase in the actual damages.
153. See notes 161-70 infra and accompanying text. See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 186-88 (2d ed. 1970); Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the
Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1201 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exhaustion
of State Remedies).
154. The educational context, in particular, provides a host of administrative remedies
which students and teachers may pursue if their rights have been violated by either an
executive or an administrative official of the school district. In the case of students,
California provides a procedure whereby expulsions are appealed to the County Board
of Education after a hearing by the local board. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10608 (West
1973). The procedure at the hearing by such a governmental agency (the State Board
of Education) is specified in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11506 (West 1973).
The State of Washington provides a particularly enlightened example of a meticulously
detailed procedure for students to follow, because the legislature recently enacted a stat-
ute dealing with the due process rights of students. WASH. AD. CODE, ch. 180-40 (1972).
See generally Note, Education-Due Process for Washington Public School Students, 50
WASH. L. REv. 675 (1975).
Under the new Washington statute, formalized administrative procedures are required
for hearings on expulsions or suspensions. WASH. AD. CODE § 180-40-140. The student
is given advance notice of the initial hearing by an impartial decision maker, and the
student's parents are invited to be present to be appraised of the charge against the stu-
dent. Id. § 180-40-140(2). If an adverse judgment is rendered, the student has five
days within which to appeal to the local school board. Id. § 180-40-140(5). If the
student wishes to further appeal the local board's adverse finding, he may do so within
thirty days to the superior court in the county in which the school district is located.
Id. § 180-40-155.
In the area of teachers' employment hearings, the state of Arkansas provides a rather
explicit set of administrative appeal procedures. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1245 (1972).
Any teacher who is dismissed or whose contract is not renewed for the following year
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V. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The requirement of exhaustion of state administrative remedies has
become a well settled doctrine of federal judicial administration. 1" The
foremost rationale for the requirement of complete exhaustion is the
protection and promotion of the state's interest in local regulation, by
allowing the proper state agencies to "correct their own errors" before
seeking redress in a federal forum. 1" This was noted with particular
clarity in Hayes v. Cape Henlopen School District.
57
Having acknowledged and responded to the possibility of arbitrary
or unreasonable administrative actions [such as those taken by boards of
education] by establishing an administrative mechanism with procedures
tailored to review and remedy, the state or state administrative agency
has a legitimate interest in being afforded an opportunity to implement
its apparatus and initiate appropriate corrective measures. 15s
At the same time, an exhaustion requirement facilitates the efficient
allocation of judicial resources and promotes the exercise of judicial
economy which is essential for the widest possible disposition of cases in
the federal courts.159 Moreover, a plaintiff who is required to exhaust all
administrative remedies will not be disadvantaged if at a later time he or
she wishes to invoke section 1983 in a federal forum, as the bar effect of
may file a written request for a hearing by the board. The delineated procedure for the
hearing is set forth in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1246 (1970).
155. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
156. This rationale was often cited in school segregation cases, to limit intervention
by the federal courts. See, e.g., Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132, 137 (8th Cir. 1959);
Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 818 (1960).
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the interest of the states in local regulation
was emphasized, as the Court called for federal deference to state procedures under the
doctrine of comity. The Court emphasizes:
The concept [of comity] does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more
than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National
Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the
concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate in-
terests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Govern-
ment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States.
Id. at 44. See generally Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies il Sec-
tion 1983 Cases, 41 U. Cmu. L. R~v. 537 (1974). [hereinafter cited as Comment, Exhaus-
tion of State Administrative Remedies].
157. 341 F. Supp. 823 (D. Del. 1972).
158. Id. at 832.
159. See Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1974); Comment, Exhaustion
of State Administrative Remedies, supra note 156, at 540-41.
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res judicata does not attach to state administrative proceedings. 160
The existence of an exhaustion requirement in suits brought pursuant
to section 1983 has been the subject of considerable discussion and
disagreement.' 61  The raging conflict in the existing case law under-
scores the lack of consistency surrounding the issue of whether, and
under what circumstances, exhaustion is a prerequisite to filing an
action under the Civil Rights Act.162 In particular, the circuit courts of
160. The principle underlying the doctrine of res judicata is that every party should
have his day in court, but once the decision of the tribunal is made final, and all avail-
able appeals have been utilized and finally determined, the same parties may not reliti-
gate the issue. The objective is to prevent the courts from needless waste of time, and
to effectuate repose in the determination of controversies. See generally 18 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1974); Note, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65
HARv. L. REV. 818 (1952).
Given the reason for the doctrine of res judicata, it would be inappropriate to impose
the bar in subsequent judicial proceedings.
The principle of res judicata is designed for adjudication, typified by a court pro-
ceeding, and many perplexities of res judicata in administrative law concern non-
judicial or unclassifiable functions. Courts normally apply law to past facts which
remain static-where res judicata operates at its best-but agencies often work with
fluid facts and shifting policies. The regularized procedure of courts conduces to
application of the doctrine of res judicata; administrative procedures are often
summary, parties are sometimes unrepresented by counsel, and permitting a second
consideration of the same question may frequently be supported by other similar
reasons which are inapplicable to judicial proceedings.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATWVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 3 (1960).
Davis concludes that the sound view is to reject the doctrine of res judicata with re-
spect to administrative hearings, when the reasons against it outweigh those in its favor.
Id. at 345. Presumably, when the issue of possible violation of federally guaranteed
rights is at stake, the courts would find a compelling reason to reject the doctrine. This
has been noted by several courts which have refused to impose an exhaustion require-
ment when the plaintiff invokes the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416
U.S. 802 (1974); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Lopez v. Williams,
372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973). The avoidance of imposing the res judicata doc-
trine on administrative proceedings where constitutional rights are in issue is a reason-
able one, and serves the additional function of encouraging rather than discouraging a
resort to administrative relief before invoking a federal cause of action. The exhaustion
of administrative remedies postpones rather than precludes the assertion of federal juris-
diction. See Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 219
(1938); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-52 (1938).
161. See generally Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies, supra note 153; Comment,
Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies, supra note 156.
162. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (state appellate remedies must
be exhausted in defense of nuisance allegation under applicable Ohio statute before re-
sort to federal district court unless the party can show irreparable injury); Houghton
v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (exhaustion of administrative remedies not required in
suit against prison authorities for confiscating materials gathered in preparation of ap-
peal); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967) (relief under Civil Rights Act was
not precluded by failure to seek relief under state administrative law available for chal-
lenging welfare laws); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (exhaustion of state reme-
dies was not necessary when such remedies were inadequate to produce relief from false
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appeals are divided on the breadth of the Supreme Court's decisions
concerning section 1983 and a litigant's rights to resort to a federal
tribunal in lieu of prior appeal at each available administrative level.' 08
Much of the conflict appears to center upon whether the available
administrative remedies are deemed to be "adequate" enough to require
the plaintiff to pursue them before submitting the controversy to federal
adjudication.'" In the school context, this is particularly difficult to
determine, as often there are problems of time and expense which will
cause greater damage to the plaintiff than would the immediate filing of
a complaint under the Civil Rights Act." 5 While some administrative
arrest and detention); Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1974) (adminis-
trative process must be pursued until the case is "ripe" for judicial determination); Blan-
ton v. State Univ. of N.Y., 489 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1973) (failure of disciplined students
to follow administrative appeals procedure outlined in published student handbook is not
absolute bar to federal relief but will be weighed as one of the factors in a determina-
tion if they were deprived of their constitutional rights to procedural due process);
Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1973) (while there is no automatic requirement
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, there must be some institutional determination
of the issues before section 1983 is invoked).
163. The first, second and ninth circuits have all made exhaustion of administrative
remedies a prerequisite to the filing of a section 1983 suit in certain situations. See,
e.g., Beattie v. Roberts, 436 F.2d 747 (lst Cir. 1971); Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177
(1st Cir. 1970); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969); Taney v. Reagan, 326
F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The fifth circuit, on the other hand, has held that
a plaintiff is not required to pursue either state judicial or administrative remedies prior
'to bringing suit under section 1983. See, e.g., Chisley v. Richland Parish School Bd.,
448 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1971); Rainey v. Jackson State College, 435 F.2d 1031 (5th
Cir. 1970).
164. The rationale behind such a consideration is to insure that a plaintiff is not need-
lessly frustrated by expending time and energy on appeals through the proper admin-
istrative channels, if those appeals will not adequately compensate for the injuries which
have occurred. See McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973) (test to deter-
mine adequacy of state administrative remedy is the degree of due process that the prison
inmate will receive, including the extent of prejudgment that takes place, whether the
remedy is being administered in an even-handed manner, and the extent of the state's
interest in the subject matter of the federal litigation); O'Brien v. Galloway, 362 F.
Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1973) (because a discharged police officer could refer to no deline-
ated procedure for reinstatement, the administrative remedies were inadequate, and he
was not precluded from bringing suit in federal court).
It was for such reasons that the Civil Rights Act was adopted; section 1983 provides
a remedy where the state remedy is, for all practical purposes, unavailable. See CoNo.
GLOBE, 42D CONG., lsT Ss. 460 (1871). In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, the Su-
preme Court analyzed section 1983 extensively, concluding that it has three functions:
(1) to overrule certain kinds of state laws; (2) to provide a federal remedy where the
state remedy, though adequate in theory, is not available in practice; and (3) to provide
a remedy where state law is inadequate.
165. For example, a student who has been expelled may have difficulties in obtaining
an immediate injunction to restrain the board from depriving him or her of the opportun-
ity of attending school. See Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 188 n.1 (8th Cir. 1973).
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procedures do not cause a deprivation of rights until the conclusion of
the administrative process, 6' this is rarely the case when constitutional
infractions against students and teachers are involved.167  Whether it be
a lack of procedural due process in an expulsion 68 or employment
termination hearing,1' 9 or the censoring of protected constitutional rights
to freedom of religion, 70 expression' 7' or association, 1 7  a requirement
that the plaintiff make futile appeals through several administrative
panels before being allowed to seek judicial redress for constitutional
infractions has been deemed by the Court to be contrary to the very
purpose of the section 1983 remedy. 1 7  Thus, regardless of the exist-
ence of an exhausion requirement, the failure to resort to state adminis-
trative remedies will preclude a section 1983 action only when the
available administrative remedies are adequate and effective. Although
Because the appeals process on the administrative level is often slow and arduous, each
day the student is forced to remain away from school increases the damages. Cf. Rack-
ley v. School Dist. No. 5, 258 F. Supp. 676 (D.S.C. 1966), where the court held that
a probationary teacher should not be denied the right to immediate resort to federal
courts for an injunction restraining her removal from employment while she undertook
to exhaust inadequate or ineffective administrative remedies.
166. See Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies, supra note 156, at
549 n.61. For instance, in some states, the license revocation process allows an individ-
ual charged with abuse of a permissive license to practice until the completion of the
administrative proceeding. Therefore, the individual is not deprived of anything until
the administrative process has run its c6urse. This is not the case in the school context,
where expulsions and non-renewal of employment contracts are ordinarily effective im-
mediately.
167. See notes 165-66 supra and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975).
169. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Smith v. Losee, 485
F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
170. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
171. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); West Virginia
State Ed. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
172. Holliman v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1971).
173. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In the landmark case of McNeese v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), the Supreme Court indicated that a constitutional
claim is of such fundamental importance that immediate resort to the federal courts is
not only justified, but in many situations is necessitated. Moreover, Justice Douglas
noted in the majority opinion that "[it is immaterial whether the [board members']
conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state law. Such constitutional claims are en-
titled to be adjudicated in the federal courts." Id. at 674.
Four years after the McNeese decision, however, the Court declared that a constitu-
tional claim alone will not provide a plaintiff with an exemption from all requirements
for seeking administrative relief. According to the Court, the primary inquiry in
a determination of whether exhaustion is required is the adequacy of the administra-
tive remedy rather than whether a constitutional right is being asserted. See W.E.B.
Du Bois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967).
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the determination of what constitutes an "adequate" or "effective" ad-
ministrative remedy is difficult of application, 174 the courts have been in
general agreement that a plaintiff should not be obligated to pursue
procedures which are inherently futile,175 or which would be unproduc-
tive and could further damage his constitutionally protected rights.' 70
The existence of a stringent exhaustion requirement would not, there-
fore, alleviate the potential threat of a flood of section 1983 actions
against school board members when the administrative remedies are
deemed unsatisfactory.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Comment has not been to condemn the attempt by
the United States Supreme Court to enforce constitutional rights enjoyed
by public school students and teachers. Few individuals would argue
with the Court's statement in Goss that the due process guarantees in the
Constitution do not cease to exist at the school house door. The ques-
tions which have been raised have been directed at an analysis of the
Court's method more than at its motive. Admittedly, this analysis raises
many more questions than it answers. The necessity for holding school
board members accountable for their actions in order to meet the re-
quired constitutional standards is not at issue; the standards by which
their accountability is to be determined is the critical problem. Holding
average school board members to a standard of "knowledge" which may
be interpreted to be beyond their capabilities is clearly not the way to
impress upon them the need to conform their official activities to the
tenets of the Constitution.
The reason that the Court's standard in Wood v. Strickland is difficult
174. See generally Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies, supra
note 156.
175. See, e.g., Haughton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In addition, the proce-
dures must be sufficiently delineated either through statute, regulation or practice to per-
mit the individual and his attorney to accurately assess their responsibilities and oppor-
tunities within the administrative process and the probable efficacy of that process.
Hayes v. Cape Henlopen School Dist., 341 F. Supp. 823, 831 (D. Del. 1972).
176. See Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies, supra note 153, at 1208, where it is
noted:
It has been suggested that, in some circumstances, the desirability of a prompt de-
termination may be augmented by the fact that state statutes or regulations may
"create pressures . . . analogous to the 'chilling effects' of strictures upon first
amendment rights."
Id. at n.49, citing Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM.
L. Ray. 84, 101 (1967) (footnotes omitted). See also March v. School Bd., 305 F.2d
94, 98-99 (4th Cir. 1962); Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960).
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of application is that it utilizes terms which it fails to decisively
define: "basic," "settled," "indisputable." These terms are suscepti-
ble to a seemingly endless variety of meanings, varying with one's
interpretation of the myriad sets of legal standards which are encom-
passed by "constitutional law."
It is impossible to accurately speculate on how the lower federal
courts will interpret the Wood standard in future personal liability
actions brought against school board members under section 1983.
Given the underlying rationale for the doctrine of qualified immunity,
and given the need to encourage rather than discourage the interest of
qualified candidates to assume the role of directing the nation's schools,
it is probably safe to assume' that board members will not often be
held to knowledge of fine points of law over which legal scholars fail
to concur. It is the vast middle ground, however, which may cause
difficulties with application of the standard. For example, where is the
line to be drawn between what the average person would be expected to
know about the implementation of procedurally fair and constitutionally
adequate expulsion hearings, and what the judiciary has decreed are
required procedures? Who is to determine what specific rights a stu-
dent or teacher possesses under the "liberty" and "property" concepts
of the fourteenth amendment, and when these rights have attained
"settled" status?
It is with difficult problems such as these that lower courts must now
grapple in an attempt to discern which principles of constitutional law
are sufficiently established to have become "unquestioned." Unfor-
tunately, until the Supreme Court speaks to the issue once more, the
lower courts can look only to each other for guidance; Wood v. Strick-
land provides sorely inadequate assistance.
Patricia L. Stearns
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